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IN THE WAKE OF FLORIDA v. J.L. - WHEN




In Florida v. JL.,2 the United States Supreme Court held
that in cases in which a police officer's authority to make an initial
stop is at issue, "an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability...
does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges
the illegal possession of a firearm."3  The Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of police officers forming reasonable suspicion
based on anonymous tips over the course of numerous years. By
providing guidance regarding how to conduct stops on the basis of
anonymous tips, J.L. 's holding has had a vast impact on the lower
courts. This article explores the J.L. decision and its interpretation
by the lower courts. The focus is on recognizing when anonymous
tips provide reasonable suspicion to conduct police stops
' J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Touro Law Center; B.S., Rutgers University,
2000.
2 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
3 Id. at 274.
1
Silvermintz: In the Wake of Florida v. J.L.
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
742 TOURO LAWREVIEW [Vol 19
subsequent to this decision and in light of the Fourth Amendment.
Part II discusses the Fourth Amendment and case law addressing
investigatory stops first discussed in Terry v. Ohio.4  Part III
examines JL. and the Supreme Court's modification of the
conditions under which an anonymous tip provides the reasonable
suspicion necessary to conduct a Terry stop. Finally, it explores
the effect J.L. has had on the circuit courts.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE "STOP AND FRISK"
A. The Fourth Amendment and "Stop and Frisk"
The Fourth Amendment5 governs the procedure by which
police may constitutionally stop an individual on the street, in his
or her home, or in any public place to conduct a search and seizure.
It protects citizens from being subjected to "unreasonable searches
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding probable cause is not necessary when the police
conduct a "pat down" of a suspicious individual's outer clothing).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2
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and seizures by requiring the government to show probable cause
in order to obtain a warrant for a search and seizure."6 Without
this protection, individuals would be denied the right to feel that
they will not be stopped by police at any given time to be subjected
to a search or seizure.
Courts must consider under what circumstances a search or
seizure is reasonable. In Katz v. United States,7 the Supreme Court
noted that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals, not
localities. Therefore, a Fourth Amendment inquiry does not
involve the question of whether there has been a physical intrusion
into a specific place.' The focus in any Fourth Amendment case is
the circumstances surrounding how the individual was searched,
not where they were searched.
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio,
concluded that an objective standard must be used in determining
6 Edward W. Krippendorf, Florida v. J.L.: To Frisk or Not to Frisk; The
Supreme Court Sheds Light on the Use of Anonymous Tipsters as a Predicate
for Reasonable Suspicion, 28 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 161,
161 (2002).
7 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This case involved an arrest for placing bets over the
telephone in a pay phone booth. At issue was evidence that the FBI had
obtained by wiretapping the phone. Katz argued that this violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 348-49.
8 Id. at 353.
3
Silvermintz: In the Wake of Florida v. J.L.
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
744 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 19
whether there was probable cause to conduct a search or seizure.9
To determine whether the objective standard was satisfied, a court
must ask whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief' that the action taken was appropriate"?' ° The facts
surrounding this case were that an officer noticed Terry based on
no suspicious circumstances. The officer maintained that he
learned to identify criminal activity due to nearly forty years of
experience as a police officer and a detective." After observing
Terry for some time, the officer suspected he and a companion
were planning a robbery. Eventually, he approached the suspects,
and when one of them mumbled something, the officer grabbed
Terry and patted him down, discovering a pistol.'2 Terry's motion
to suppress the gun was denied and he was convicted.
Terry v. Ohio set the constitutional standard used to
determine when an officer can "stop and frisk" for weapons. 3 This
9 392 U.S. at 21-22.
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is, in contrast to the idea of "stopping" and "arresting" an
individual. 4 The prior standard requiring probable cause has been
relaxed by the Court's holding in Terry. In essence, this case has
carved out an exception to the probable cause requirement. The
Supreme Court held that:
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. 5
The type of search that took place in Terry was deemed
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 6 This standard solves
the dilemma that results when an officer "who lacks the precise
level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest...
14 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (noting that a stop and frisk is only a minor
inconvenience to be used when the police suspect an individual to be armed).
5 Id. at 30.
16 Id. at 31.
.2003]
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simply shrug[s] his shoulders and allow[s] a crime to occur or a
criminal to escape."' 7 Terry has given officers the right to use their
own instincts to fight crime by eliminating the probable cause
standard in instances involving a stop and frisk.
B. Tips From Known nJbrimanis
What happens when a known informant (one who has
supplied the police with information in the past regarding criminal
activity) approaches an officer on the street and provides
information about another who is about to commit a crime? This
problem was confronted by the Supreme Court in the 1972 case,
Adams v. Williams. "8 In Adams, the Court considered whether a tip
from a known informant that the defendant was carrying a gun was
enough to justify a Terry stop.' 9 Following a face-to-face tip from
a known informant, the officer approached the defendant's vehicle
to investigate. When the defendant rolled down his window, the
officer reached into the car and recovered a revolver from the
'7 David S. Rudstein, White on White: Anonymous Tips, Reasonable Suspicion,
and the Constitution, 79 KY. L.J. 661, 662 (1991).
18 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
'9 Id. at 144.
6
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defendant's waistband, which was precisely where the informant
indicated the revolver would be located.20
Looking to Terry, the Court explained that "[a] brief stop of
a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to
the officer at the time."'2' The Court then addressed how to
determine whether conducting a Terry stop is proper when the
information leading to the stop was from a known informant. Such
scenarios require case-by-case analysis taking into account the
indicia of reliability of the information.2 Examples of when a tip
has the requisite indicia of reliability are "when the victim of a
street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of
his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific
impending crime."23 Under Adams, tips from known informants
carry the requisite indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.
20 Id. at 145.
21 Id. at 146. See also supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
22 Id. at 147.23Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.
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(. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Anonymous Tips
Although the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause
to conduct a search or seizure, there are exceptions to this rule.
"Included in these exceptions is the warrantless 'stop and frisk' of
a citizen based on a mere 'reasonable suspicion."' 24 This exception
is invoked when the police receive tips that individuals are
carrying weapons or other contraband. What if the police receive
an anonymous phone call indicating that an individual at a specific
location wearing specific clothing is armed? Does this anonymous
tip give police reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry search of an
individual matching that description? Complications arise when
the reasonable suspicion for a search comes from an anonymous
tip. These situations are problematic due to the competing issues
of the danger to police in dealing with potentially armed
individuals and the concern regarding false information, such as
when an anonymous tipster misinforms the police that a suspect is
armed.25
Numerous cases have addressed the constitutionality of
24 Krippendorf, supra note 6, at 161.
25 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
8
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conducting investigatory stops with reasonable suspicion based on
anonymous tips. One such case is Alabama v. White.26 In White,
an anonymous tipster called the police and provided a detailed
description of the defendant's actions, including the location she
was leaving from, her destination, and that she would be in
possession of cocaine. The police responded to the tip by
conducting a search of White's car which revealed drugs. 27 The
issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether an anonymous
tip corroborated by police exhibited adequate indicia of reliability
to warrant reasonable suspicion to bring about a police
investigation.28 In deciding that such tips provide reasonable
suspicion, the Supreme Court stated:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard
than probable cause not only in the sense that
reasonable suspicion can be established with
information that is different in quantity or content
than that required to establish probable cause, but
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise
from information that is less reliable than that
required to show probable cause.29
26 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
27 Id. at 327.
28 Id. at 328.
29 id. at 330.
9
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The Court found that the caller was honest, well informed and the
caller's predictions were verified by police corroboration."
Therefore, the stop was justified and satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's requirements.
Critics have asserted that the White decision failed to
formulate a "bright-line test to determine what establishes adequate
corroborative information."3' This defect has proved to be a
problem when lower courts have attempted to apply the White
holding. Consequently, dramatic inconsistencies have emerged in
lower court decisional law regarding the issue of when anonymous
tips provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.32 The
Second, Seventh, and Eleventh United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals have followed the White decision.33 Thus, these courts
allow anonymous tips to provide reasonable suspicion. Contrary to
the holding in White, the Third and Tenth United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals, as well as the highest courts in various states,
30 Id. at 332.
3' Krippendorf, supra note 6, at 178.
32 Krippendorf, supra note 6, at 178.
33 See, e.g., United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617 (1 1th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d
99 (2d Cir. 1994).
10
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have found anonymous tips do not provide a basis for reasonable
suspicion.34
III. CRITICAL CHANGE
A. 7he Case That A'ade the Change
Following the emergence of this split, the Supreme Court
decided Florida v. J.L.,3 which led to more uniformity among the
circuits when deciding whether anonymous tips give reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. J.L. involved an anonymous
call "that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun."36 Shortly after the call,
the police arrived at the bus stop and found three black males, one
of whom was the defendant, J.L., who was wearing a shirt that
matched the caller's description. One of the officers responding to
the tip approached J.L., conducted a Terry "stop and frisk," and
3' See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 1996); Commonwealth v. Lyons,
564 N.E.2d 390 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068 (Pa.
1997).
3' 529 U.S. at 266.
36 Id. at 268.
11
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seized a weapon from J.L.'s pocket." This search and seizure led
to a charge of "possession of a concealed, unlicensed firearm."3
J.L. moved to suppress the gun because the police had
discovered it during an alleged unlawful search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. He claimed the search was unlawful because
it was based on an anonymous tip.39 His motion to suppress the
gun was granted by the trial court, but reversed by the intermediate
appellate court." However, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed
with the trial court and held that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.4 The Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that
anonymous tips are "less reliable than tips from known informants
and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion only if
accompanied by specific indicia of reliability .... 4' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
search and seizure based on an anonymous tip was constitutional.43
37 Id.
38 Id. at 269 (noting that J.L. was also charged with "possessing a firearm
while under the age of 18" in violation of state law).
39 Id.
40 State v. J.L., 689 So. 2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
4 J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204, 209 (Fla. 1998).421 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269 (citing J.L., 727 So. 2d at 207).
43 Id.
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/8
2003] IN THE WAKE OF FLORIDA V J.L. 753
This decision further clarified the holding in White by shedding
light on what the corroboration requirement is.
Terry v. Ohio set the standard for "stop and frisk" cases. In
Terry, the reasonable suspicion of the police officer came from the
officer's own observation of the suspect. Florida v. J.L. is
distinguishable from Terry because the officers' suspicion was
solely based on a call from an anonymous tipster." J.L. recognized
the need to set a standard for when an anonymous tip will warrant
a Terry "stop and frisk." Although anonymous tip cases do not
usually meet the indicia of reliability necessary to conduct a stop,
there are cases in which they do. Turning to precedent, the Court
considered the facts of Alabama v. White to decide whether this
was one of those cases. In White, the tip alone was insufficient to
give the police probable cause for a Terry stop. The question was
whether the police corroboration supported the reliability of the
anonymous tip such that it met the constitutional standard of
reasonable suspicion.45 The Court found that the officers' own
44 Id. at 270.
45 White, 496 U.S. at 326-27.
13
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observations after receiving the tip justified the search.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court labeled it a "close" case because
most people are not privy to an individual's itinerary. Thus, it is
reasonable for police to believe that an individual with access to a
person's itinerary is likely to know about that individual's illegal
activity. 6  However, just being aware of an individual's
movements does not necessarily indicate whether the individual is
taking part in criminal activity.
Because the anonymous tip in J.L. gave no "predictive
information and therefore left the police without means to test the
informant's knowledge or credibility," 47 the Court distinguished
JL. from White. J.L. held that in cases where "the officer's
authority to make the initial stop is at issue ... an anonymous tip
lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams
4
and White does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however
[the tip] alleges the illegal possession of a firearm. '49 Therefore,
46 Id. at 332.
47 J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
48 407 U.S. at 146 (distinguishing "a tip from a known informant whose
reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations
turn out to be fabricated").49J.L., 529 U.S. at 274.
14
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the police must corroborate anonymous tips prior to conducting a
stop and frisk. Thus, the decision to stop an individual cannot be
based on an unknown informant's description of an individual's
clothes, appearance, or location. The Court also declined to adopt
a "firearm exception" because anyone could harass another by
subjecting that individual to an intrusive police search simply by
placing an anonymous call and falsely reporting that an individual
is carrying a gun."
The Supreme Court's holding in J.L. has formed a
framework for lower courts to utilize when determining how to
proceed with cases in which reasonable suspicion to stop is based
on an anonymous tip. An anonymous tip alone that someone is
about to commit a crime will never establish the reasonable
suspicion needed to justify a search of that person. "Anonymous
caller's tips only justify an investigatory stop once they are
sufficiently corroborated by the police."'" All tips must be
investigated prior to conducting a stop. "A tip that includes
specific information regarding criminal activity, and that provides
501d. at 272.
5' 14A FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 22 (2001).
15
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a specific description of the suspect, will justify a stop when the
officers act promptly and corroborate the information contained in
the tip. 5 2 Because there was no corroboration of the anonymous
tip in J.L., the evidence was excluded as having been seized during
an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3
B. The E/.fict of]'lorida 1'. J.L.
Following J.L., there have been many cases decided in the
circuit courts involving when anonymous tips give reasonable
suspicion to search In United States v. Jones,54 the Fourth Circuit
considered whether an anonymous 911 call made to the police
reporting that several African American males were causing a
disturbance was sufficient to justify a stop of the defendant's
vehicle. There was no other physical description given. The
responding officers did not find any disturbance in the area
described by the caller. After departing the scene, one of the
officers passed a vehicle occupied by four African American
52 Id.
.JL., 529 U.S. at 274.
4 242 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2001).
16
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males. Solely based on the race of the occupants, the officers
stopped the vehicle." When the officer pulled the car over, he
noticed open bottles of alcohol. An open bottle of alcohol in a
vehicle violated a South Carolina statute. Consequently, Jones was
arrested. As the arrest took place, the officer patted down Jones
and recovered a plastic bag containing crack cocaine. 6
The Fourth Circuit considered whether an anonymous 911
call, along with the officers' observations of a vehicle occupied by
members of the same race as the caller described, provided
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.57  Looking to J.L. for
guidance, the court held that the anonymous tip lacked sufficient
indicia of reliability. The court found that the tip in this case was
even less reliable than that given in J.L.. There was no description
of the culprits other than that they were black males. The car that
was pulled over was not even in the vicinity of the location which
the caller had specified. When the police searched the area and
found no one, the anonymous tip was totally uncorroborated."
"Id. at 216.
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Therefore, the officers had no right to stop the car merely
because it was occupied by four African American males. The
court followed the reasoning in J.L. and found the anonymous tip
led to an unconstitutional search and seizure. This case indicates
that the Fourth Circuit holds that a vague description of a
suspected perpetrator from an anonymous tipster will not satisfy
the corroboration requirement of J.L.
In United States v. Colon,59 the Second Circuit considered
whether information given to a civilian 911 operator may be
imputed to the dispatching or arresting officers when the civilian
operator has not made an assessment of reasonable suspicion.6"
Colon involved the following facts. A woman placed a 911 call to
inform the police of an armed man inside a club she had just left.
She declined to identify herself when asked by the dispatcher. The
caller also indicated that the armed man had hit her over the head
with the gun and gave a physical description of him.6' During the
course of the call, she explained that the man in question was the
same individual who had also assaulted her during a previous
'9 250 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2001).
60 Id. at 134.
61 Id. at 132.
18
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incident of which the police were aware.62 The dispatcher then
transmitted the information to the New York Police Department
via computer.63 The police responded to the call; found Colon,
who matched the suspect's description; conducted a stop and frisk;
found a gun on him; and then arrested him.64
The prosecution and defense agreed that without the
specific information describing the incident given to the 911
operator, the stop and frisk would not have met the standards set
forth in JL.. They also agreed that if the information given to the
operator had been given to an officer instead, a stop and frisk of
Colon would have been permissible.6" The court held that the
Terry stop of the defendant violated the Fourth Amendment. The
holding was based on the fact that "the 911 operator's knowledge
could not be imputed to the dispatcher because the operator lacked
the training to assess the information in terms of reasonable
62 Id. (noting that she did not want the armed man to find out that she informed
police).
63 Id. The computer entry "included the location, a description of the suspect
as a male Hispanic wearing a red hat and red leather jacket with the nickname
'white boy,' and the fact that the suspect has a firearm." Id.
64 Colon, 250 F.3d at 132.
65 Id. at 134.
19
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suspicion. ' '16 The Court did not say that New York City should
abandon the 911 system in effect at that time, but rather that
civilian 911 operators should be trained to obtain the proper
information necessary to satisfy the reasonable suspicion
requirement.67
Prior to J.L., courts had allowed the admission of
contraband into evidence following what would now be an
unlawful search and seizure based solely on an unreliable
anonymous tip. The district court decided Kerman v. City of New
York"8 prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in J.L.. Therefore, the
Second Circuit reviewed the case based on the law as it was
preceding J.L..69 In Kerman, the appellant's girlfriend made an
anonymous 911 call in which she provided the dispatcher with the
plaintiffs address and phone number and informed the operator
66 Id. at 138. (noting that the operator also left out information which could
have led the officers to conclude that a stop and frisk could be conducted).
67 Id. (indicating that the officers could have gone to the scene and observed
the subject, which could have given them a reason to search).
68 No. 96 Civ. 7865, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10870 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1999).
69 Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2001). The court
affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for all of the police
officers regarding the entry into Kerman's home. However, the court
established precedent that this behavior would not be tolerated in future cases
based on JL.. Id.
20
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that he was mentally ill, not medicated, and possibly armed.7' The
police responded to this call by forcibly entering the plaintiffs
home, handcuffing him, searching his home, placing him in a
restraint bag, and taking him to a hospital.7' The plaintiff asserted
that the police performed these acts with excessive force.
The Second Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs contention that
the "police officers violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment by forcibly entering his apartment without a warrant
and by handcuffing, detaining and hospitalizing him without
probable cause."72 In deciding the issue, the court looked to J.L. to
determine whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a
forcible entry into the plaintiffs home. It was not disputed by the
defendants that the sole reason they forcibly entered Kerman's
apartment was due to the anonymous 911 call.73 The officers failed
to investigate the reliability of the anonymous source prior to
70 Id. at 232. These events occurred following the plaintiff's calling his
girlfriend and telling her that "he was drunk and intended to buy a gun and kill
himself or his psychiatrist." Id
71 Id. at 233-34. The plaintiff's girlfriend called during this episode and
explained to police that she was the one who made the initial anonymous call.
The police did not try to verify any information regarding the original call. Id.
72 Id. at 234.
13 Id. at 235.
21
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entering the apartment. This could have been done by using a
surveillance system to watch the appellant's apartment for any
suspicious circumstances. The police could have also contacted
Kerman's family and friends to inquire as to his whereabouts.
The Second Circuit found "that the Court's reasoning in
J.L. controls the issue here: whether an uncorroborated and
anonymous 911 call is sufficient to establish probable cause for a
warrantless entry into a dwelling."74 Even though the anonymous
call in Kerman may have presented a more imminent threat of
harm, there was a greater interest in privacy involved. The officers
did not conduct a Terry stop on the street; they forcibly entered the
plaintiffs home and subjected him to an extremely invasive search
and seizure.75 The court extended the corroboration requirement
necessary to conduct a stop and frisk to a warrantless search of an
individual's home. As a result of these findings, the court held that
due to the officers' failure to corroborate the 911 call and the
protection the Fourth Amendment provides when searching private
dwellings, the officers' warrantless entry into Kerman's apartment
74 Kerman, 261 F.3d at 236.
75 Id.
22
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violated the Fourth Amendment.76 The reasonableness of an
officer's belief that a warrantless search of one's home is necessary
must be decided on a case-by-case basis, assessing the
circumstances present at the time of the search."
Kerman gives a broad interpretation of J.L.. The facts in
the two cases are considerably different. However, they both
involve anonymous tips given to law enforcement officials. In
J.L., a Terry search was conducted, while in Kerman a warrantless
search of the home was performed. Therefore, the Kerman
decision mandates corroboration of anonymous tips to satisfy the
"indicia of reliability" prerequisite to conduct warrantless searches
of homes. J.L. 's holding, requiring corroboration of anonymous
tips to conduct a Terry stop, will be applied to cases where the
threat may be more imminent but the search involves a lesser
invasion of privacy.
76 Id. at 237. At the time the entry into the plaintiff's apartment occurred, JL.
had not yet been decided. The law at that time did not prohibit "a warrantless
entry into an apartment on the ground of exigent circumstances based solely on
an anonymous 911 call." This is why the court could not base this decision on
JL., but in future cases it would follow JL.. Therefore, summary judgment for
the defendants was affirmed. Id.
77 Id.
23
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The First Circuit distinguished the facts of United States v.
Link"8 from J.L.. The informant in Link, "unlike the tipper in
J.L. ... was not only known to the police, but had also provided
reliable information in previous investigations. '79 The informant
gave the police step-by-step information about what the defendant
was going to do. The police were able to corroborate every tip that
the informant provided."0 "The risk, therefore, 'of a lying or
inaccurate informer [had] been sufficiently reduced by
corroborative facts and observations."'' 1  It is also important to
note that because the information given by the known informant
was enough to provide probable cause which led to Link's arrest,
the seizure did not constitute a Terry stop requiring reasonable
suspicion.82 Because every piece of the known informant's story
turned out to provide accurate information, information that the
defendant was going to commit a crime was more likely to be true
than not. Thus, when dealing with known informants, the
238 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2001).
79 Id. at 110.
80 Id. at 108-09.
SI Id. at 110 (quoting United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 284 (1st
Cir. 1997)).
82 Id. at 109. The court still addressed the case of Florida v. J.L. because the
defendant used it to argue his case. Id.
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reliability problem discussed in J.L. is lessened because of the
officer's ability to verify the source.3  Therefore, verified
information from known informants provides police with probable
cause to arrest, contrasted with an anonymous tip that, once
corroborated, allows police to conduct a Terry stop, as was held in
J.L.."4
Do the courts regard tips from-face-to face encounters with
confidential informants the same as a tip from an anonymous
informant? The concurring opinion in Florida v. J.L. noted that an
anonymous tip given to police by an unnamed informant who
approaches an officer face-to-face to report that criminal activity is
taking place can be considered reliable. 5 The Fourth Circuit
determined this issue in the 2000 case of United States v.
Christmas.86 In Christmas, an individual approached two officers
and said to one of them, "You need to come and deal with the
drugs and the guns that these guys have on the porch two doors
83 Link, 238 F.3d at 110-11.84 1d. at 112.
85 J.L., 529 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86 222 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2000).
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down from me.""7  In response to that information, the officers
approached the specified location, and one of the officers advised
those present, including the defendant, that they were investigating
a tip regarding contraband on the property. One of the officers
then conducted a pat-down of the defendant which revealed a
loaded weapon. This prompted the officer to conduct "a more
thorough search [which] yielded a plastic bag containing a large
amount of crack cocaine and marijuana. '"88
Christmas argued that "in light of Florida v. JL., d tip
from a woman living two doors away from the porch where he had
gathered did not provide reasonable suspicion for the protective
pat-down of his person." 9 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with this
argument. The court interpreted JL. narrowly as applying to
anonymous tipsters who contact police via telephone.' By
contrast, the tipster in Christmas approached the police face to
face; the officer, therefore, could assess the tipster's demeanor.
"Unlike an anonymous tipster, a witness who directly approaches a
87 Id. at 143 (noting that the informant gave the specific address of where the
complaint came from, but did not provide the officer with her name).
88 id.
89 id.
90 Christmas, 222 F.3d at 143-44.
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police officer can also be held accountable for false statements."9'
The court also stated that "a community might quickly succumb to
a sense of helplessness if police were constitutionally prevented
from responding to the face-to-face pleas of neighborhood
residents for assistance. 92
Christmas made a clear distinction between cases where
reasonable suspicion was based on anonymous tips and those
based on face-to-face tips by informants. This distinction depicts
the importance of police response to concerns of individuals who
feel they may be in danger. "When a victim of a street crime seeks
immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or
when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime -
the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate
police response. 93  Christmas appears to have placed greater
importance on the safety of informants and the rest of the
community than the Fourth Amendment protection of individuals.
91 Id. at 144 (indicating that here the informant provided her address, which
could be used to locate her if it was discovered she had given false information
to the police).
92 Id. at 145.
93 Rudstein, supra note 17, at 666.
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In 2000, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Valentine,94
also made a distinction between anonymous tips and those based
on face-to-face encounters. In Valentine, two officers patrolling a
high crime area were stopped by a male who informed them that he
had just seen an armed man.95 After receiving a description of the
gunman, the police set out to look for him. Not far away, the
officers found three men, one of whom matched the description
given by the informant.96 The officers approached the men and
told them to put their hands up, but the suspect tried to run away.
One of the officers managed to grab him and forced him to the
ground. During the attempt to restrain the defendant, his gun fell
to the ground. This was the first time either officer had seen the
gun.97
The court was called upoA to determine whether there was
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop of the defendant.9" In
deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed in this case, the
94 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1014 (2001).
95 Id. at 352. When the male was asked to identify himself, he refused, which
was common due to fear of "retribution from the armed man or entanglement
with the police." Id.
96 Id. at 353.
9 7 
id.
98 Id. (indicating that the District Court found that there was no reasonable
suspicion to stop and frisk).
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court noted that it "must consider 'the totality of the
circumstances-the whole picture."'" The court also looked to
Florida v. J.L. for guidance in conducting its analysis and
distinguished this case from J.L.."° "The informant's tip in our
case is different from the telephone call in J.L.. First, unlike J.L.,
the officers in our case knew that the informant was reporting what
he had observed moments ago, not what he learned from stale or
second-hand sources."'"' The court also noted that "[t]he Supreme
Court has recognized the greater weight carried by a witness's
recent report."'0 2 The court further explained that a face-to-face
informant is more credible than an anonymous caller. In relying
on other circuits, the court found that the "Fourth Circuit recently
explained, when an informant relates information to the police face
to face, the officer has an opportunity to assess the informant's
credibility and demeanor.' ' 0 3 Through this reasoning, the court
99 Valentine, 232 F.3d at 353 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8
(1989)).
'o Id. at 353-54.
'0' Id. at 354. The informant told the officers that he saw the defendant
carrying a gun just prior to giving the police the information. This led the
officers to believe that the informant had a reasonable basis for his information.
Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. (citing Christmas, 22 F.3d at 144).
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concluded the tip was reliable. 4  The reasonable suspicion
requirement was satisfied when the defendant attempted to leave
the scene after the police arrived.0 5
On these facts, the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's
ruling and held that the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.0 6 In cases dealing with tips from anonymous face-
to-face informants, the circuits are likely to find reasonable
suspicion to conduct a search. Thus, the reasoning of JL. will not
be followed in determining if a search was constitutional in cases
where the tip comes from a face-to-face informant, due to the fact
that the Supreme Court did not address that issue in J.L..
"The United States Supreme Court in JL. refused to draw a
bright line rule for or against anonymous tips."' 7 Therefore, courts
decide this issue on a case-by-case basis. "The key [is] 'indicia of
reliability."''" After reviewing how the circuit courts have
104 Valentine, 232 F.3d at 355. "[T]he informant was exposed to retaliation
from Valentine and knew that the officers could quickly confirm or disconfirm
the tip; and the officers could assess the informant's credibility as he spoke,
knew what the informant looked like, and had some opportunity to find the
informant if the tip did not pan out." Id.
105 Id. at 357 (indicating that his act of walking away alone does not supply
reasonable suspicion, but it arises when put in context along with the tip).
106 Id. at 352.
107 Krippendorf, supra note 6, at 191.
'08 Krippendorf, supra note 6, at 191.
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interpreted the decision in Florida v. J. L., it can be deduced that
there is now more uniformity among the circuits when faced with
the issue of anonymous tips and reasonable suspicion. Although
there are different fact patterns in each case, the courts' analyses of
JL. are rather consistent. The major focus is on the reliability of
the tip at hand and corroboration of the tip prior to conducting a
search.
IV. CONCLUSION
Florida v. J.L. has had a great impact on the issue of when
reasonable suspicion based on an anonymous tip will allow a
constitutional stop and frisk. There are many variations to this fact
pattern. Even though there is no bright line test set forth in J.L.,
there has been more uniformity among the circuit courts when
deciding cases dealing with reasonable suspicion based on
anonymous tips. Not only have the courts applied JL. to cases
dealing with anonymous callers, but also to those involving known
informants and face-to-face encounters with tipsters. The theme
throughout all of these decisions is the reliability of the source of
the tip and how the police corroborate tips in formulating the
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reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a stop. These steps are
taken to balance the need to shield the public from crime with the
Fourth Amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and
seizures."" 9
109 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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